Current doctrine: mistake of fact ("M Fact") v. mistake of criminal law ("M Law") II.
Overview of normative perspectives III.
The fundamental distinction between M Fact and M Law IV.
The distinction elaborated A. Difficulties locating the boundary between fact and law 1. Mistake as to an evaluative (rather than descriptive) criterion 2. Is every unreasonable M Fact really a M Law? 3. Three borderline cases, including Mr. Fact/Mr. Law B.
Converting M Fact into M Law V.
Conclusion
Introduction
The complexities of ignorance and mistake of fact and of law in criminal law doctrine and theory are legion. How do we distinguish fact from law? Is it worth drawing the distinction? Is the distinction equally significant for exculpatory mistakes (potentially resulting in acquittal of the completed crime) and for inculpatory ones (potentially resulting in attempt liability)?
Contemporary criminal law draws a firm distinction between fact and law for purposes of both exculpation and inculpation. Moreover, as we will see, all of the major normative perspectives on the proper scope of a defense of ignorance or mistake of criminal law agree that the law/fact distinction should at least sometimes be preserved.
Yet some have objected that the distinction is incoherent or misguided. These objections are serious. In my effort to defuse them, I hope to demonstrate how we should draw the distinction in the particular context of criminal liability, why the distinction matters, and why it is sometimes especially treacherous.
To set the stage, I begin with four problems or conundra.
First consider the problem of evaluative criteria. Suppose a defendant uses marijuana to relieve a medical condition, and asserts the necessity defense as a defense to prosecution for illegal drug possession. And suppose his defense is rejected. Was it rejected because he misunderstood the legal standard that the fact-finder applied in judging what counts as a lesser evil? (Perhaps the jury believed that urgent medical need can never justify use of marijuana.) Or because the fact-finder rejected his factual claims? (Perhaps the jury believed that his medical problem was not sufficiently serious to be an urgent medical need.) If the jurisdiction requires the jury to apply a more demanding standard when excusing for mistakes of law than when excusing for mistakes of fact, yet we do not know the basis of the jury's rejection of his claim, how can we determine whether it acted lawfully?
Second, consider the question of how to characterize an unreasonable mistake of fact-for example, a defendant's unreasonable assessment of the facts about the victim's age, where the crime forbids sexual intercourse with a person younger than a particular age. The determination that such a mistake is "unreasonable" is, in an important sense, a legal judgment. Does that mean that the distinction between mistakes of law (about the governing legal norm) and mistakes of fact (about whether defendant's actual conduct instantiates that norm) is, at least in this category of cases, misguided?
Third, the evolution of criminal law standards seems to magically convert mistakes of fact into mistakes of law. Consider the dramatic recent transformation of actus reus and mens
Nov. 17, 2008 Simons, Mistake of Law and Fact rea standards concerning nonconsent in rape law. A number of jurisdictions have not only rejected stringent resistance requirements; they have also, roughly speaking, moved from "NO means NO" to "Only YES means YES." That is, only an affirmative expression of willingness to engage in the act of intercourse suffices as legal consent in these jurisdictions.
Suppose a defendant, unaware of this new legal requirement, has intercourse with a victim who does not affirmatively express such willingness, but who does not verbally or physically protest. Has he made a mistake of fact or law about her nonconsent? Does the law care which kind of mistake he made? Should it care?
Finally, consider the fact/ law distinction in a different context, inculpatory mistakes.
Under the modern consensus, the distinction matters a great deal in deciding what types of "impossible" attempts warrant attempt liability:
(1) A defendant can be guilty even if the attempt is "factually impossible" (i.e., the actual facts are such that it was impossible for him to commit a crime). Suppose D1, while hunting out of season, shoots at what he believes is a live deer, but he is actually shooting at a stuffed deer. He is guilty of the attempt to hunt out of season.
(2) But a defendant cannot be found guilty if the attempt is truly "legally impossible"
(i.e., if, had the facts been as he believed them to be, he would not be committing a crime). Suppose that D2 knows that he is shooting at a live deer, but he incorrectly believes that the state prohibits all hunting of deer, when actually the state permits deer hunting.
Yet this modern consensus is challenged by a famous example from Sandy Kadish, Mr. Fact/Mr. Law. The example seems to demonstrate that the fact/ law distinction should make no difference to attempt liability.
Mr. Fact and Mr. Law Mr. Fact and Mr. Law both set out independently to get a jump on the bow-hunting season by sneaking out a day before the season begins. For technical reasons, the exact date of the state's bow-hunting season for deer tends to change from year to year, but [the] date this year is Friday, October 15. Ironically, Messrs. Fact and Law each make a mistake that results in their stalking and killing deer on what they mistakenly believe to be the day before the hunting season but is actually the first day of the season itself (Friday, October 15). Mr. Fact makes the factual mistake of thinking, "Today is Thursday, October 14." Mr. Law makes the legal mistake of thinking, "The season begins on Saturday, October 16." While each is butchering his deer carcass, he is each approached by a game warden who intends to congratulate him. Instead, Mr. Fact and Mr. Law both confess, thinking they have been caught red-handed while hunting out of season.
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But is this tenable? Is there really any good reason to convict one but not the other?
In this essay, I will try to show the following. First, under any plausible normative perspective, the distinction between mistake (and ignorance) of criminal law and of fact must at least sometimes be drawn. Second, the fundamental distinction is between a mistake about the state's authoritative statement of what is prohibited ("M Law"), and a mistake about whether that prohibitory norm is instantiated in a particular case ("M Fact"). Third, when an actor makes a mistake about an evaluative criterion whose content the fact-finder has discretion to elaborate, it is impossible both to allow this discretion and to faithfully realize a jurisdiction's policy of treating M Fact and M Law differently. Fourth, the claim that every unreasonable M Fact is really a M Law elides important differences between the two kinds of mistake. Fifth, various borderline objections, such as the Mr. Fact/Mr. Law example, do not undermine the fundamental distinction, although in rare instances, they do constitute genuine counterexamples that do not effectuate the principles and policies that the distinction ordinarily serves; and even here, they are exceptions that prove (the rationale for) the rule.
Sixth, specification or evolution of a criminal law norm, such as the criterion for nonconsent in rape law, can convert a legally relevant M Fact into a legally irrelevant M Law. This phenomenon does not undermine the fundamental distinction between these types of mistake;
to the contrary, it reveals the significance of that distinction.
I. Current doctrine: mistake of fact ("M Fact") v. mistake of criminal law ("M Law") Let us begin with the basic doctrinal picture, which depicts how ignorance and mistake of fact and law are relevant under modern American criminal law. 2 Sometimes they are potentially exculpatory (even though the actor has satisfied the actus reus of the crime), and sometimes potentially inculpatory, i.e. they potentially warrant attempt liability (even though the actor has not satisfied the actus reus of the crime).
Suppose it is illegal knowingly to sell a cigarette to a person under the age of eighteen. And assume that the mens rea requirement of "knowledge" applies to all the material elements of the offense. Here are four scenarios that illustrate the modern approach.
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The conservative view
Under this approach, M Law is never a defense. Whether the law should require low or high levels of culpability as to the facts constituting the offense is treated as a completely distinct issue.
Notice that under all views but the first, we need to distinguish M Fact from M Law in at least some cases. Although the first view does not demand such a distinction, that view itself is highly implausible. Consider two clear implications of this view, each of which is very difficult to accept:
(1) If we retain the current high culpability requirements for serious offenses (e.g., requirements that the actor knowingly or purposely bring about the harm), then we must permit even an unreasonable M Law to serve as a defense in a significant number of cases (e.g, whenever an offense such as theft or murder permits a defense for an unreasonable M Fact).
(2) But if we believe that only a reasonable M Law should provide a defense, the approach requires that only a reasonable M Fact will be a defense (thus precluding any mens rea requirement greater than negligence).
9
Moreover, the state often has good reason to impose different mens rea requirements (with respect to the factual issues) for different elements of offense. (Rape statutes require that the defendant intended to engage in intercourse, but often only require that he be negligent or reckless as to the victim's nonconsent.) We then face a problem. When pegging the culpability required with respect to the illegality of the conduct to "the" culpability required with respect to the facts, we actually might have two or more options for the latter. with serious penalties, we might wish to require her to know that she started the fire, and know that she was likely to seriously damage a building, but we might be content if she was merely negligent as to the legal question whether the crime of arson extends to an unoccupied as well as an occupied building. If instead we required only that the actor be negligent as to all of these elements, or that she be negligent as to the factual elements but knowing as to all of the legal aspects of her conduct, the culpability she would thereby express would be too modest to warrant severe punishment.
10
10 Or reconsider Adam (who was mistaken about the cigarette buyer's age and thus believed that she was above the legal age of eighteen) and Connie (who was not mistaken about the buyer's age of seventeen but mistakenly believed that the legal age for such sales was sixteen The fundamental distinction is between:
(1) M Law: a mistake about what the state prohibits (including a mistake about how state officials, including judges, authoritatively interpret the prohibition); and (2) M Fact: a mistake about the instantiation of that prohibitory norm in a particular case, where the mistake does not flow from the first type of mistake.
negligence for a M Law such as Connie's (thus excusing only for reasonable mistakes). Imposing a duty on all sellers to assure themselves of the governing legal rules is not very burdensome, but imposing a duty on pain of criminal liability to find out the relevant facts about a buyer's age is more burdensome and arguably is unduly harsh unless we require a higher level of culpability as to facts-knowledge or at least recklessness. 11 For an analysis along these lines, see Westen (2008) . For the argument that such an actor deserves modest criminal punishment, for attempting to violate (what he took to be) the criminal law, see Fletcher (1986: 59) ; for the contrary argument, see Duff (1996: 156-159) . 12 I concede that this approach might need modest qualification depending on one's underlying normative perspective, and depending on whether the question is the relevance of mistake to exculpation or instead to inculpation. The question before us is how to distinguish law from fact for purposes of these exculpatory and inculpatory criminal law doctrines. The law/fact distinction obviously is drawn differently for other legal purposes, such as allocating decision-making authority between judges, juries, and administrative agencies. 
13
More precisely, Westen elucidates the distinction this way:
The "law," for the purposes of the test [distinguishing attempts that are factually impossible from attempts that are legally impossible], consists of a full specification of the act-types that the state officially declares to be punishable. The "facts" consist of the empirical features that determine whether conduct is an act-token of what is acknowledged to be a prohibited act-type. It follows, therefore, that no middle ground exists between law and fact, and there are no "mixed" mistakes that consist of neither one nor the other.
14 Although Westen is here investigating the distinction in the context of impossibility and potentially inculpatory mistakes, his characterization also applies to a possibly exculpatory M Fact or M Law that a defendant will try to claim warrants acquittal.
13 Westen (2008: 535) . 14 Westen (2008: 534-535 ) (citations omitted). In his comment on an earlier draft of this article, Alexander argues that the type/token distinction does not illuminate the law/fact distinction. I agree with him in part. He is correct that legal categories vary in their generality, so that, at least on a plausible understanding of the type/token distinction, what Westen and I characterize as a mistake of "law" could be classified as a mistake either of a law-type or of a law-token. See Wetzel (2008) . As Alexander says, the EPA's designation of polar bears as an endangered species is in a sense a token of the legal type, "the EPA's general authority to designate such species" (and, I would add, the EPA's general authority is itself a token of the legal type, "legal authority that Congress has delegated," and so forth).
But I still find Westen's use of the type/token distinction enlightening. In my view, a M Fact can always be understood as a token relative to the type* of conduct prohibited by the criminal law. That type* could, to be sure, be a broad generalization of the kind of conduct that is prohibited (a law-type, e.g. any species designated by the EPA), or instead a relatively specific instantiation of such a generalization (and thus, perhaps, a law-token, e.g. polar bears, which the EPA has designated as protected). Still, no matter how specific the relevant legal criterion is, it is apt to characterize the questions (a) whether defendant's actual conduct (e.g., shooting a particular bear) instantiates that criterion, and (b) whether defendant is correct or incorrect in believing that his conduct is or is not an instantiation, as expressing the relationship of token (factual instantiation) to type (legal criterion). Put differently, a defendant who makes a mistake about whether his conduct falls within the legal prohibition, but who fully understands the scope and meaning of the prohibition, is making a M Fact, a mistake that in an important sense is a "token" of the "type" given by that definition (no matter how specific the definition is).
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In one respect this analysis is too simple. What the law is, and how it has been authoritatively interpreted, are indeed questions of fact, 15 at least insofar as "fact" is contrasted with an actor's purely subjective perception, opinion, or judgment about the matter at hand. But the important point is that nonlegal "facts" (in this sense) can be reliably distinguished from legal "facts." As Gerald Leonard explains, a M Law "is a failure to recognize and understand the meanings of the statutory terms that govern one's case." 16 By contrast, a M Fact is a mistake "untainted by an incorrect understanding of what characteristics or circumstances the court takes to be equivalent in meaning to a statutory term." 17 As Leonard's explanation suggests, we should, when drawing the distinction, begin with an account of ignorance or mistake of law, and then treat all other claims that ignorance or mistake is relevant to criminal liability as involving ignorance or mistake of (nonlegal) fact.
Larry Alexander has challenged the fact/law distinction, claiming that because application of law is part of its meaning, factual mistakes are ultimate legal ones; and, in the context of impossibility, factual impossibility ends up being a species of legal impossibility.
18
But if "legal impossibility" here refers to true legal impossibility of the sort exemplified by Daniela, Alexander is incorrect. "Application of the law" can readily be sorted into cases where that mistaken application is based on a mistake of nonlegal fact and cases in which the mistaken application is based on misunderstanding of the legal norm.
19 To be sure, we need to understand the possible applications of legal standards in order to understand their meaning; but it hardly follows that a mistake about the facts is just a mistake about the law.
In the earlier examples, Adam does not know that the person to whom he sold a pack of 15 See Alexander (1993: 37, 57-58) (pointing out that the existence or meaning of a legal norm is a question of fact, at least for a legal positivist); Lawson (1992: 862-865) .
16 Leonard (2001: 529) . 17 Id. at 531. For other accounts of the criminal law distinction between law and fact, see Stuart (2007: 366-370) ; Williams (1961: 287-289) . 18 Alexander, (1993: 48-53 meaning-and consider whether one 'knows' the meaning of a law if he cannot identify any actual extension of it in the world-then factual mistakes are legal ones, and factual impossibility is a species of legal impossibility." [Alexander (1993: 52) ] … I think Alexander confuses "application of law" qua a state's full specification of the act-types it prohibits and "application of the law" qua actual acttokens thereof. Yes, every criminal event is an act-token of an act-type that the state has declared to be prohibited. But mistakes regarding what act-types are prohibited (law) differ from mistakes regarding whether conduct is an act-token thereof (fact). Both mistakes can result in a person thinking that he has violated the law when he has not, but the sources of the mistakes differ. The basic distinction between law and fact is straightforward and defensible, notwithstanding the claim of some skeptics, such as Alexander, that it is incoherent. But in particular contexts, it seems, the distinction either is very difficult to draw, or fails to serve the criminal law principles that it ordinarily effectuates. 20 Let us take a closer look, then, at how the distinction plays out in these more problematical contexts.
IV. The distinction elaborated
A. Difficulties locating the boundary between fact and law 1. Mistake as to an evaluative (rather than descriptive) criterion
Many instances of M Law are straightforward mistakes about an unambiguous, specific, rule-like legal criterion. Recall Connie, who mistakenly believes that it is legal to sell a cigarette to any person over the age of sixteen, and Daniela, who mistakenly believes that it is illegal to sell a cigarette to any person under the age of twenty. In this type of crime, it is unlikely that anyone would make a legally relevant mistake about what counts as being age twenty. ("Mr. Law" in the introduction makes a similarly straightforward mistake about a rule-like criterion.)
Many other legal errors are about how complex statutory provisions are to be read together. Others concern the precise definitions of elements of an offense. And still others are about how courts will later interpret an ambiguous provision. Judicial dockets are replete with examples of all of these categories.
20 Doctrinally, an important difficulty is how to treat ignorance or mistake of noncriminal law-where the criminal law itself incorporates legal norms from "outside" the criminal law. In theft law, for example, criminal law often incorporates by reference the civil property law definition of "property," and the question arises whether a requirement that the defendant "know that he has taken the property of another" requires acquittal if defendant makes a mistake (even an unreasonable mistake) about who owns the property in question. Because the issue is of less interest to criminal law theorists and philosophers, I do not address it in this paper. 21 The examples that follow raise a number of problems, including vagueness. But they are rarely analyzed as possible illustrations of M Law. For an illuminating discussion of the varieties of vagueness, and of the distinctive vagueness problems with evaluative criteria, see Endicott (2001: Ch. 3.9, 3.10, & 5.4) . 22 Similarly, when an evaluative criterion is employed as a mens rea or culpability element-for example, "negligence" or "extreme indifference to the value of human life"-it is very difficult to specify the content of the criterion. See Simons (2003a) . But the special problem of distinguishing M Fact from M Law does not arise here, because the criminal law does not require an actor to possess mens rea as to his own mens rea. However, whether "negligence" is a mens rea or actus reus element is itself disputed. See note 43 infra. 23 Simester & Sullivan (2007: 489-495 of how to classify mistakes as "law" rather than "fact" in this context.
27
The problem arises for a wide variety of evaluative criteria. As a second example, recall the discussion in the introduction of the defense of lesser evils. The explicit requirement that the actor choose the "lesser evil" inevitably must be stated without detailed elaboration, since the criterion needs to be broad enough to apply to any crime.
Consider two more illustrations. Yet, because most jurisdictions treat a M Law less favorably than a M Fact, this characterization could determine whether it is proper to convict him.
31
To be sure, a defendant can always request an instruction specifying the legal standard more precisely. But in many situations, it is legitimate for the judge to demur, and to conclude that the jury should have the discretion to employ a more opaque, evaluative, relatively unspecified norm. In determining what counts as dishonesty in fraud, we might want the jury to apply its moral judgment; an alternative approach, specifying by very 27 This is only a problem, of course, insofar as the evaluative criterion is not further specified by the jurisdiction's legal authorities. If the state supreme court resolves the question whether the first or second interpretation is correct, then the difficulty I have identified does not arise. 28 Canadian courts have given the latter answer. See Stuart (2007: 369) . 29 Imagine that a passenger railroad switches to a new, cheaper method of storing luggage that increases by 1% the risk that a piece of luggage will fall and injure a passenger. 30 The jury might have concluded that he actually created a 5% risk of harm, but might have agreed with him that a 1% risk is always legally insufficient. In that case, he has made a mistake of fact. Or the jury might have instead concluded that (a) he was not factually mistaken about having created a 1% risk of harm, yet (b) he was legally incorrect in believing that a risk greater than 1% is always necessary for criminal liability. 31 Another set of examples come from international criminal law. See Eser (2002: 921-925, 936-937) (discussing, inter alia, war crimes by "inhumane" treatment and environmental damage "excessive" in relation to military advantage). 32 See Buell (2006 : 1987 -1996 . 33 Another possible solution is to instruct the jury conditionally, taking into account the jurisdiction's differential legal treatment of M Fact and M Law. For example: "If you find that the defendant made a mistake of fact, you must find for the defendant, whether or not the mistake was reasonable; but if you find that the defendant made a mistake of law, you should ignore that mistake." [Or, in place of the last clause: "you must find for the defendant if you conclude that his mistake of law was reasonable"]. But this solution does not seem realistic. 34 85 Miss. 687, 38 So. 46 (1905) . Wilson is discussed in Alexander (1993: 46) , and Simons (1990: 466-467) . See also People v. Teal, 89 N. E. 1086 , 196 N.Y. 372 (1909 (where D tried to suborn false testimony, but the testimony concerned a matter that was legally immaterial to the proceedings), discussed in Alexander (1993: 46) ; Duff (1996: 96-98); and Simons (1990: 467-468 
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The law, almost all would agree, properly views as unreasonable the defendants' beliefs in that case that the female victim was consenting, since their beliefs were based only on her husband's assurances that she was consenting notwithstanding her clear protests and violent struggle when three of them had intercourse with her. Leonard reads the case essentially as involving a mistaken belief by the defendants about the meaning of consent: the defendants thought that consent could exist under such circumstances, when the law declares otherwise. 39 Leonard points out that, although the House of Lords concluded that (a) an unreasonable but honest mistake of fact about nonconsent does (and in a different case would) preclude punishment for rape, it also determined, based on the egregious facts, that (b) no reasonable jury could have believed that the defendants in the actual case were honestly mistaken about nonconsent. But Leonard characterizes the second determination, like the first, as a judgment that the defendant has actually made a M Law! In his view, when the court finds insufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that defendant could have genuinely subjectively believed that the victim was consenting, it is really pointing out that the defendant could only hold such a belief if he misunderstood what "consent" means.
I find the argument illuminating, but in the end unpersuasive. Leonard treats as analytically identical the following two kinds of honest mistakes: (1) an unreasonable mistake about how "consent" is legally defined (the "legal criterion" of consent), and (2) an unreasonable mistake, given the facts available to the actor, about whether the victim "consented" in the sense required by that legal criterion. Leonard is correct that on the facts 37 See id. at 573-575. 38 [1976] A.C. 182 (House of Lords). 39 Leonard (2001: 569-572 and thus is correct about the law in sense (1), but who makes a "M Law" (in Leonard's sense (2)): he mistakenly concludes that Vicky is 19, and that mistake is unreasonable. (He is very gullible and lacks experience determining the age of teenagers.) The kind of "legal" determination (if it is that) entailed in finding that Andrew's mistake was unreasonable is quite different from the kind of legal determination expressed in a statute establishing the legal age for distributing tobacco to another.
When Leonard says that an unreasonable M Fact is a case in which the defendant is making a "mistake about the meaning of the legal term" or is "misusing the statutory language," given his experience, the rhetoric conflates these two different types of legal mistakes, even if, judged by Leonard's very broad "M Law" definition, they are indeed both instances of M Law. And the rhetoric is a bit misleading. Leonard would presumably say that Andrew's unreasonable mistake represents a "mistake about the meaning of 'under age 18' given the facts available to him." This seems forced. The legal meaning of "under age 18" is not a matter of serious uncertainty. On a more natural characterization, the example is analyzed this way:
(a) The defendant makes a M Fact about whether this legal element is satisfied in his individual case, and (b) The fact finder makes a subsequent judgment that that mistake was unreasonable. 40 In that context, defendants not infrequently do make honest but unreasonable mistakes about the law in the conventional sense (sense (1)); for example, some defendants might believe that a woman legally consents to intercourse unless she resists to the utmost or to some significant extent, or that "no" means "yes" unless the woman clearly and repeatedly expresses her unwillingness.
Nov. 17, 2008 Simons, Mistake of Law and Fact
Even if the latter judgment is properly described as a judgment about "the law" (insofar as it is a normative judgment that the individual fact finder has the authority to make), this type of judgment is very different from a more straightforwardly "legal" mistake about whether 16 or 18 is the minimum legal age for the prohibition on distributing tobacco to a minor. It is not at all clear that the criminal law should treat both types of judgment the same.
At the same time, Leonard's argument, though ultimately unpersuasive, is instructive in two important ways. First, he is correct that we often do not focus on the precise legal meaning of a criminal law term until we need to apply it to a concrete fact pattern; as a result, Second, there is merit to Leonard's point that when a fact finder finds an actor's mistake "unreasonable," the fact finder is making an explicitly evaluative judgment, a judgment that is in this respect similar to the judgment it must make when applying statutes employing explicit evaluative criteria of the sort that we discussed in the previous sectionsuch as "dishonesty" in fraud, choice of "lesser evils" in the necessity defense, or creation of a "substantial" risk in negligence and recklessness doctrine.
Nevertheless, these two types of evaluative judgment also differ in a significant way.
The determination that the actor made an unreasonable M Fact is a second-order evaluative judgment, which supervenes on a factual belief that the statutory standard makes relevant.
By contrast, when the statutory standard itself requires an evaluative judgment, that is a firstorder determination. When we explored the complexities and ambiguities of such evaluative criteria earlier, we could easily distinguish the criterion itself from the mens rea the actor possessed with respect to the criterion. (We could ask whether "dishonesty" means "violating customary business standards," and then we could separately ask whether Cynthia knew what the legal test was, and also whether she knew facts that, as a matter of law, 41 As Leonard puts it: "Legal meaning seems to lie in concrete applications, and any materially unreasonable evaluation of a scenario must be a failure to understand legal meaning and thus a mistake of law." Leonard (2001: 592 But he has not offered sufficient grounds for such a dramatic conclusion. The Mr. Fact/Mr. Law bow-hunting example, set forth in the introduction, is often offered as a reductio ad absurdum of the fact/ law distinction. The modern legal approach to 43 Leonard does not endorse such a requirement, but it seems to be an implication of his argument. When Leonard asserts that an actor's mistake about whether a gun is loaded is in effect a legal mistake about what counts as unjustifiable conduct, id. at 580-581, he is treating the actor as analogous to Cynthia, when the actor is arguably more analogous to Andrew. However, there is a genuine dispute about whether to treat the "unjustifiable risk" criterion for manslaughter as providing (1) a short-hand legal criterion of permissible conduct, or instead (2) a mens rea (or mens rea-like) requirement for the causal result, death. If the first interpretation is correct, then it would be more plausible to also require mens rea as to that criterion (for example, to require that the actor know that his conduct is, or might be, unjustifiable, or to require that he should have known this). All risk-creation offenses are ambiguous in this way.
What is the Model Penal Code's view of these matters? My understanding is that the fact finder is to determine as a matter of law what counts as an "unjustifiable risk," and that the Code's definition of recklessness (which requires some form of subjective awareness) does not require awareness or belief that one's conduct is unjustifiable, though it does require awareness (a) that one's conduct poses a substantial risk of harm and (b) of the facts that make one's conduct unjustifiable. Simons (2003b: 189) . But this account of recklessness reveals that it is a bit of a mixture of interpretations (1) and (2) months) is arbitrary. By contrast, establishing the specific dates when hunting may take place is presumably designed (a) to solve a coordination problem (other citizens have a right to know when it is safe to walk in the woods without having to wear orange or bright clothing) and (b) to manage and limit the total number of prey that are killed that season. One could serve these purposes by selecting any hunting period of equivalent duration, any time of the year. Why does this matter? In many "true" legal impossibility examples, e.g. when someone erroneously believes that fornication is a crime, or that public criticism of the government is a crime, or that a repealed criminal statute is still in effect, the defendant's view of the interests and values currently protected by the criminal law is seriously at odds with the legislature's. That he or she is willing to violate the criminal law is troublesome, to be sure, but serious criminal punishment for acting on that disposition is unacceptable. Even in the sale-to-minors example, where the age limit is to some extent arbitrary, the legislature has a less arbitrary reason for establishing the age distinction than in the Mr. Fact/ Mr. Law example. Recall Daniela, who believed that the law punishes the sale of cigarettes to those under twenty, when actually it prohibits sales only to those under eighteen. It would be at least somewhat troubling to punish Daniela for having a different view of the governing values in the jurisdiction than the jurisdiction actually intends to effectuate, i.e., for believing that the criminal law is more protective of younger persons than it actually is. By contrast,
Mr. Fact and Mr. Law seem equally willing to violate the law and to defy the values that the law represents (the values of social coordination and protection of wildlife). Mr. Law's mistake about the actual dates of the hunting season hardly reflects a benighted belief that the criminal law is more protective or more rigorous in protecting animals from hunting, or in preserving quiet, than it turns out to be. Rather, the criminal law turns out to be arbitrarily different in its scope than he expected it to be. In such a case, the policy arguments against punishing for legally impossible attempts are considerably weaker.
46
Still, the distinction between fact and law is a sharp one. And there are good pragmatic and prudential reasons for relying on this distinction in defining the scope of attempt liability. The "law" side of the distinction correlates very well (though not perfectly, given borderline cases like Mr. Fact/ Mr. Law) with the policy against punishing actors who supposed to file by April 15. (At least, this seems as justifiable as punishing Ms. Tax Fact who files on May 1 but believes the date is May 5.) To be sure, Ms. Tax Law has made a M Law. But this is not a case where she has a view of the values protected by the criminal law that differs in any way from the legislature's view. The original Mr. Fact/Mr. Law example is less arbitrary, however, if the actual dates are relevant to a social harm-for example, if the no-hunting period is chosen in part because that is when animals give birth. (I thank Stan Fisher for this observation.) 46 A similar argument can be offered on the exculpatory side. Here, too, the fact/law distinction has much less force if the legal classification is quite arbitrary. Suppose Mr. Fact2 makes an exculpatory factual mistake about what day it is: if his belief were true, he would not have been hunting illegally. Now suppose Mr. Law2 makes a legal mistake about the dates when hunting is permitted: if his belief were true, he would not have been hunting illegally. Should Mr. Law2's belief also exculpate? If the dates of the hunting season are arbitrary, I incline to answer yes, even though, in the analogous cases of Adam and Connie, it is defensible to exculpate Adam (who made a factual mistake) more readily than Connie (who made a legal mistake), e.g., to excuse Adam even for an unreasonable mistake but to excuse Connie only for a reasonable mistake.
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Simons, Mistake of Law and Fact believe that the criminal law is more rigorous than it turns out to be. It would be very difficult to identify reliably the small category of cases (such as Mr. Fact/ Mr. Law) in which the actor's view of the values protected by the criminal law is no different at all from the legislature's. And, if one is skeptical about the justice or efficacy of attempt liability in general, one would demand a more compelling reason for extending the scope of liability for this category of impossible attempts.
To conclude, in the "Mr. Fact/Mr. Law" example, it is quite easy to distinguish the relevant M Fact from the relevant M Law. While the example initially seems to raise a serious question about whether that distinction should ever be employed to identify which mistakes should result in attempt liability, on closer analysis the example is simply the rare exception that proves (the rationale for) the rule.
b. M Fact engenders mistake about the content or scope of the law
The second borderline objection is that a factual misperception or mistake can lead to an error about the content or scope of the law. In such a case, it seems, the fact/law distinction breaks down. Alexander gives several examples, including the following:
(1) A woman knowingly imports French lace, but she misreads the word "Flemish"
as "French" on the list of dutiable items, and thus erroneously believes that French lace must be declared. She does not declare the lace.
(2) A man knows that the state forbids hunting on days when a red flag is displayed at the Fish and Game Department office but permits hunting on days when a green flag is displayed. He is colorblind, and misperceives the green sign as red. He nevertheless hunts.
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In each case, the actor's factual misperception leads to their erroneous belief that what they are doing is a crime. In a sense, then, each is a factual impossibility case, so one might think that each actor should be guilty of an attempt. But this conclusion is unwarranted. The M Fact in these cases is unusual: it is not about the nature of the actor's primary conduct or about any other actus reus element of the crime (as in the usual M Fact case, such as believing that the recipient of a cigarette is younger than she actually is, or believing that the victim at which one is shooting is still alive). Rather, the M Fact concerns only the scope or meaning of the criminal prohibition; it concerns what actus reus elements the criminal law actually does require. We should therefore treat each case, for legal 47 Alexander (1993: 49-50 And in the converse scenarios, where the actor misreads the word "French" as "Flemish" or misperceives a red flag as green, and the actor claims that his mistake is a M Fact that should excuse, we should reject this characterization and apply whatever rule we would otherwise apply to a M Law.
To be sure, one might understandably conclude otherwise: facts are facts, and factual misperceptions as a class arguably should be treated differently than misunderstandings of the law untainted by factual misperceptions. (In terms of Westen's useful suggestion for distinguishing M Fact from M Law, quoted at the outset, in these unusual M Law cases, the actor needs a good private investigator as much as she needs a good lawyer!) Still, treating every factual misperception that results in a misunderstanding of the content or scope of the 48 Westen agrees with me that the first example should be treated as a M Law. As he explains:
[The woman] is making a mistake of law, because while she knows the empirical features that her conduct actually possesses, she does not know that the state has declared conduct with such features [not] to be a prohibited act-type. Westen (2008: 535 n. 34 ). (I have added " [not] " to the passage because this is clearly Westen's meaning, and he has confirmed this interpretation by email. Email from P. Westen to K. Simons, dated May 8, 2008.) ) Surprisingly, however, Westen treats the second example as a M Fact, for the following reason:
[A]n actor who knows that the state declares hunting on days with a red flag to be an act-type of poaching, but who, being colorblind, sees a red flag where there is actually a green flag, makes a mistake of fact because, while he knows what act-types are prohibited, he mistakenly thinks that his conduct possesses one of the empirical features that, if present, constitutes what he knows is the act-type.
I disagree with Westen's treatment of the red flag case in this article. In both this case and the Flemish/French case, the actor does not make a mistake about her primary conduct or about any actus reus element; rather, their mistake (albeit factual) is about the scope of the law. In the red flag case, to be sure, the scope of the law is publicized to the public in an unusual way. But this is no different than, say, a Roman consul announcing the terms of a relevant law orally, and a citizen mishearing the words he spoke, Grendel's Den, Inc, 495 U.S. 116 (1982) , in which churches were in effect authorized to prohibit bars from locating within a particular distance of the church. "Suppose an establishment owner believes erroneously that a church next door has objected to his opening a bar, but he does so anyway. Has he made a mistake of law (it's illegal to open a bar next to the church) or only of extension [of the law, and thus, a M Fact]?" Alexander (2002: 839) . This is a borderline case because we do not ordinary treat entities such as churches as authorized to declare the content of the law; their ability to restrict the defendant's property rights (on pain of his criminal liability) seems to express their private rights, and thus seems analogous to a person's ability to withhold consent to a physical touching, and therefore within the province of M Fact, not M Law. By contrast, when a government official has the authority to declare today a hunting day by raising a green flag, a mistake about what color flag he has raised is more straightforwardly a mistake about the scope of the criminal law.
Nov. 17, 2008 Simons, Mistake of Law and Fact criminal law as a M Fact would be problematic. Insofar as a jurisdiction has plausible reasons for generally treating a M Law less favorably than a M Fact (e.g., requiring only the former mistakes to be reasonable), it is not at all clear that those reasons warrant special favorable treatment of the unusual cases we are considering. Alternatively, if the better view is that the jurisdiction should more liberally excuse for a M Law, this new principle should be adopted categorically, and not arbitrarily limited to these unusual cases in which a M Fact fortuitously is a partial explanation for a genuine M Law.
c. Laws that designate a particular object or person
The third and last "borderline" objection concerns laws that pick out a particular object or have a unique designation. And the term "borderline" is especially apt here, because one illustration of this category is a mistake about a legal boundary. Cases in this category are indeed sometimes difficult to sort into M Fact or M Law, though in principle, the distinction remains viable here.
It is tempting, Leonard points out, to think that a mistake about "law" must be about a general criterion or category, such as how "property" is defined or whether the age of consent is eighteen or twenty-one. But actually, a "legal" criterion can refer to a unique object, entity, or person. 49 Thus, if it is a federal crime to assassinate "the President," then the defendant could make either a relevant factual or a relevant legal mistake. Robinson (1984: 380 & n. 26) . See also Leonard (2001: 519, 527, 536) . 53 Leonard (2001: 536) . 54 See note 46 supra. 55 See section IV.A.3b, above. Another, little-noticed aspect of the interaction is where ignorance of law engenders ignorance or mistake of fact. If I do not know that the law requires me, an ex-felon, to register after residing in a city for five days, cf. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) , then perhaps I also will not "know" all the facts that make my conduct illegal. Do I "know" that I have resided in the city for five Under the old criterion, this is almost impossible to determine. Defendants are likely to fare much worse under the newer provisions, since defendants now are vulnerable to the government's objection that their mistake (for example, a mistake about whether it was "proportionate" to use force to shoot an escaping rapist) is one of law and thus does not excuse. There is nothing objectionable about such a legal change. After all, the very point of the change is to establish a new and more demanding set of legal requirements.
At the same time, further specification might sometimes produce resulting distinctions between M Fact and M Law that seem morally arbitrary. Consider again the law of self-defense. Under the imperfect self-defense doctrine, many states reduce the grade of homicide when a person makes an honest mistake about facts such as the severity of the force threatened, even if that mistake is unreasonable. But, as Gerry Leonard points out, this doctrine has a troubling implication: a defendant who kills an attempted robber is better off arguing that he honestly thought that the victim was trying to kill him, even if his belief is quite unreasonable, than arguing that he honestly (but mistakenly) thought that deadly force is a legally proportionate response to a robbery (even if the robber does not threaten deadly days? Do I "know" that I have not registered if I don't realize I have a duty to do so? Perhaps I have given these matters no thought. But if the statute in question requires knowledge of all these facts, then even if the jurisdiction endorses the maxim, "ignorance of law does not excuse," it might turn out that ignorance of the law frequently excuses defendants because that ignorance results in their failing to know the legally relevant facts! When this is so, ignorance of the law turns out to be an excuse, after all. See Simons (2003b: 194 it is worth examining the change in actus reus and mens rea standards with respect to nonconsent.
As noted in the introduction, the law in some jurisdictions has seen a remarkable evolution.
In broad outline, these jurisdictions first rejected traditional resistance requirements; then rejected any "force or threat of force" requirement, moving instead to the standard of "NO means NO" (i.e., verbal "resistance" suffices); and finally settled on the position that "Only YES means YES." Under New Jersey's MTS case, for example, only an affirmative expression of willingness or permission to engage in the act of intercourse suffices as legal consent.
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This evolution was designed to be more protective than prior law of a victim's right of sexual autonomy and right to be free of force, coercion, and violence. It has been an evolution of actus reus requirements, not of mens rea requirements, at least as a formal matter. That is, few jurisdictions have expressed their greater solicitude for the rights and needs of victims by lowering the mens rea requirement, or by grading sexual assault crimes by mens rea. Rather, almost all have reduced the actus reus requirements, and many have created grades of sexual assault offenses, distinguished primarily by different actus reus requirements.
To be sure, the traditional resistance requirement could partly be explained as a crude effort to require an especially culpable mens rea. After all, anyone who persisted in intercourse when the woman was actively resisting had an especially blameworthy state of mind. The "threat of force" requirement might be analyzed similarly.
However, the elimination of these traditional requirements does not simply lower the required mens rea as to nonconsent (defined in an invariant way over time). It also is widely 56 Leonard (2001: 590 But what about the last step, from "NO means NO" to MTS, which essentially holds that "only YES means YES"? Arguably, when a jurisdiction takes this step, it is really changing the mens rea requirement, not the actus reus. The argument goes as follows.
Although formally, MTS establishes a different and weaker actus reus requirement, substantively the law is really employing the same underlying conception of consent, and at the same time lowering the mens rea requirement. MTS in effect says to the defendant: you are culpable as a matter of law if you take "silence" or ambiguous signals as legally valid consent.
On this view, MTS is open to serious criticism, namely, the criticism that it requires far too little (indeed, perhaps it requires nothing) in the way of substantive mens rea as to nonconsent. 58 For MTS seems to ignore the plain fact that someone could reasonably believe that the victim is consenting, yet violate the MTS rule. If the victim says nothing, and is passive during the encounter, at least sometimes the defendant might reasonably believe that she is consenting.
Implicit in this argument is the assumption that legally valid "consent" means something like "subjective desire or willingness to have intercourse, not induced by any type of threat." And in the view of such a skeptic, MTS is just a sneaky way of converting a negligent or even reasonable M Fact about "nonconsent" (so understood) into a M Law. On this view, MTS conceals the fact that it really is imposing rape liability for the most attenuated degree of negligence, or even for a completely faultless mistake, as to "nonconsent."
That is how the argument goes. But there is a counterargument. The counterargument is that MTS really is about actus reus, not mens rea. For MTS really does mean to require a different type of "consent" in order for intercourse to be legal-namely, an actual affirmative expression of permission. So even if a woman is subjectively willing, her At the same time, this approach is controversial. It means a woman (or non-initiating person) cannot legally consent except by affirmatively stating her preferences. This will to some extent diminish the power of individuals to have sexual relations on the terms they most prefer, since some might prefer that they did not have to express their affirmative permission.
But, of course, the reply is that this is not too great a cost to bear, relative to the harms to victims who are genuinely unwilling and silent, and who, for a variety of reasons, are not able to, or do not, clearly say "no." for an adult to serve liquor to an underage person, some previous claims of M Fact (about whether one was thereby contributing to the delinquency of a minor, or whether one knew that the minor would drive drunk and cause harm) are now legally irrelevant. Or if the state enacts a new criminal law forbidding driving while intoxicated, some previous claims of M Fact (e.g., about whether one was recklessly endangering others) again become irrelevant.
59 Schulhofer (1992: 74-75) . 60 Schulhofer (1998: 270 adults now owe a more stringent duty to minors not to contribute to their intoxication; adult drivers now owe a duty not to drive intoxicated. We should certainly expect, then, that such changes will also change the types of M Fact that are legally relevant.
V. Conclusion
The arguments in this paper have addressed conceptual and normative issues, but have scanted practical concerns. There are, however, important reasons to hesitate before implementing some of the analysis into legal doctrine, especially when the analysis suggests broader attempt liability than current law provides. jurisdictions were to liberalize in this direction, it is highly unlikely (for reasons that I have explored above) that they would, or should, want to abolish all distinctions between M Fact and M Law, either when exculpating defendants from liability for completed crimes or when inculpating defendants for attempts. This article tries to provide a precise analysis, in a wide range of contexts, of how the distinction should be drawn, why it runs into difficulties in a few narrowly circumscribed areas, and how those difficulties can (and why in some cases they cannot) be overcome.
61 See Simons (1990: 488-492 (suggesting caution before broadening attempt liability because of concerns about the unreliability of proof); Westen (2008: 550) (stating that he would not propose actual adoption of his broader view punishing culpable but legally impossible attempts because adoption would only rarely prevent injustices yet would generate serious difficulties).
